

# The DYNABIC approach to resilience of critical infrastructures

## ABSTRACT

With increasing interdependencies and evolving threats, maintaining operational continuity in critical systems has become a significant challenge. This paper presents the DYNABIC (Dynamic business continuity of critical infrastructures on top of adaptive multi-level cybersecurity) approach as a comprehensive framework to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructures. The DYNABIC approach provides the resilience enhancement through dynamic adaptation, automated response, collaboration, risk assessment, and continuous improvement. By fostering a proactive and collaborative approach to resilience, the DYNABIC framework empowers critical infrastructure sectors to effectively mitigate disruptions and recover from incidents. The paper explores the key components and architecture of the DYNABIC approach and highlights its potential to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructures using the concept of digital twins in the face of evolving threats and complex operating environments involving cascading effects.

## CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computer systems organization** → **Embedded systems**; *Redundancy*; Robotics; • **Networks** → Network reliability.

## KEYWORDS

Cybersecurity, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Digital Twin, SecDevOps

### ACM Reference Format:

. 2023. The DYNABIC approach to resilience of critical infrastructures. In *Proceedings of Make sure to enter the correct conference title from your rights confirmation email (STAM '23)*. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 7 pages. <https://doi.org/XXXXXXX.XXXXXXX>

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Most of essential services in modern societies rely on Critical Infrastructures (CIs), which are large-scale complex cyber-physical systems (CPS). Due to their criticality, CIs must show a high level of resilience, i.e. they need to be “able to withstand, adapt and quickly recover from all hazards whether natural or man-made” [15]. These infrastructures are becoming more and more natural targets for attacks, and the new EU CER Directive [8] is born to be the definitive stimulus for European critical entities to be conscious of the need of protecting such infrastructures and pushing the hard work to protect them. In joint efforts with NIS 2 Directive [7], the CER Directive aims at reducing vulnerabilities in CIs and enhance their resilience. The directive requires that Member States identify the

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STAM '23, September, 2023, Benevento, Italy

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ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-XXXX-X/18/06...\$15.00

<https://doi.org/XXXXXXX.XXXXXXX>

critical entities in Europe and that these entities ensure adequate technical, security and organisational measures are taken to protect their infrastructures and prevent incidents.

Today, CIs are largely leveraging software systems and the growing adoption of Internet of Things, Cloud, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) as integral part of the systems has opened the door to new cyber-physical attack vectors whose sophistication requires new approaches to CI resilience. Moreover, CIs do not work in isolation, but their services are interleaved with services of other CIs. A CI may depend on a third-party service provider or have hybrid capability. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to empower the operators of CIs (named *critical entities* in CER Directive) with means to predict the extent and ways business disruptions and cyber-physical damages can propagate between the critical infrastructure systems and from one CI to another. Improving the CI capacities at preparedness, detection and response phases requires the attention to the human factor as well as the collaboration of heterogeneous organisations involved in the CI development and operation (e.g., using security orchestration platforms), ensuring a continuum of care, just as it is done for other ICT systems with the adoption of SecDevOps approaches. To effectively support the operations of security orchestration platforms, security tools developers, operators, and integrators should play a pivotal role in integrating a wide range of security tools into these platforms [16]. They require comprehensive knowledge of the shared and diverse layers within security orchestration platforms. This understanding enables them to enhance the integration process and contribute to the development of new solutions.

This paper first presents the DYNABIC research roadmap, identifying the key challenges for critical infrastructures to effectively prevent and mitigate disruptions and recover from incidents. We introduce an extension of the SecDevOps methods and tools and discuss the related DYNABIC contributions to address these challenges, which will be realized into the DYNABIC Framework. This framework will be explored and further developed in the newly founded DYNABIC H2020 project that started in December 2022.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the research roadmap in terms of technical challenges and state-of-the-art. Section 3 details the overall DYNABIC approach, illustrates how it will help addressing these research challenges and describes the set of enablers that forms the core of the DYNABIC Framework. Finally, Section 4 concludes.

## 2 THE DYNABIC RESEARCH ROADMAP AND RELATED WORK

The strategic objective of DYNABIC is to increase the resilience and business continuity capabilities of European critical services in the face of advanced cyber-physical threats. This objective will be pursued by delivering new socio-technical methods, models, and tools to support resilience through holistic business continuity risk management and control in operation, and dynamic adaptation of responses at system, human and organization planes. More

precisely, this objective is underpinned by the following research sub-objectives.

*Research Objective 1: Enable operators of CIs to predict, quantitatively assess, and mitigate in real-time business continuity risks and cascading effects in interconnected CIs.*

*Context:* Business Continuity Management refers to the capability of organizations to keep their critical business processes working in the event of disruptive events [38]. As part of business continuity management, organizations must systematically implement procedures for business impact analysis and risk assessment. In the context of CIs, this must be done considering cascading effects across interconnected CIs.

*State-of-the-art:* There are multiple risks management methodologies and tools, such as CORAS [20] and OWASP RRM [27]. However, none of these tackle the challenge of managing risks dynamically nor do they leverage risks records [2]. On risk analysis itself, several approaches have been proposed such as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [37], cause and effect (Ishikawa) charts, enhanced attack-defence trees (ADTs) [34] and Bayesian approaches. The last have been proved effective in risk analysis of industrial control systems (ICS) [31]. Bow-tie analysis [6] is becoming popular particularly in high-hazard industries. The approach proposes the combination of fault-tree and event-tree analysis to identify incident triggering events. However, the focus is on system layer analysis rather than on the analysis of the business process execution in real time. Regarding the evaluation of CIs' performance, few works consider consequence-based criteria (i.e., cross-cutting effects and interdependencies). For instance, in [39], the performance of an energy system is evaluated against hospital beds availability and mortality. There exists a number of gaps on monitoring CIs. First, resilience focuses on the consequences of disruptions rather than on their possibilities [19]. However, the majority of CI performance indicators proposed are built on specific reliability criteria that measure CIs performance against potential low impact/highly probable events, and therefore, their use to measure resilience is not recommended [33]. Second, most performance indicators do not take into account the time-dependency and context influence in the expected behaviour/outcome of CIs. Third, no unified framework exists of CI performance indicators which hinders comparison and aggregation. This is of particular importance considering that different stakeholders usually view performance from different perspectives, concerns [22] at different abstraction levels. Multiple approaches have been proposed for assessing cascading effects in critical systems, which leverage Markov chains[32], interdependency graphs [36], etc. However, most models, besides suffering from indicators limitations explained above, fail to address the intrinsic uncertainty of cyber-physical incidents and they focus on propagation within systems, rather than between interconnected systems.

*Research Objective 2: Methods and tools for disaster preparedness and the prevention of business continuity risks in cross-organisation and cross-domain incidents and attacks.*

*Context:* Complex cyber-physical systems such as critical infrastructures are typically cross-organisations and involve stakeholders,

services, and infrastructures from multiple domains. In order to prevent business continuity risks and prepare for disasters, it is important not only to monitor the system but also being able to simulate and analyse multiple types of potential attacks and disruptions. Digital twins (DTs) are thereby a perfect fit as a solution that, on the one side can reflect the status of the running system together with situational-awareness, and, on the other side, provides means to simulate the system and its interconnections. They have the potential to allow predicting the possible propagation and impact of incidents across domains, organisations, and CIs.

*State-of-the-art:* As a new and fast developing technology, digital twins start to gain attention on the use for business continuity. A modern DT combines the simulation of the physical twin and the continuous collection of real-time data from the physical twin. The DT provides interfaces to both human operators and automatic analysis tools for real-time monitoring of the systems, timely analysis of data, and the scheduling of preventive maintenance to reduce or prevent downtimes [21]. The main advantage of DTs is that they allow the simulation of the system states ahead of the time based on the current system state, and they enable to predict potential problems [30] and to test the effectiveness of different interventions to the systems [18]. The state-of-the-art research include the so-called digital supply chain twin for the monitoring and prediction of supply chain risks[17] and their integration into the management decision systems. Some companies provide loosely coupled tool chains to facilitate DT development. For example, the Azure Digital Twins<sup>1</sup> platform combines a set of Azure services for IoT, data analytics and AI, under a standard Digital Twin Definition Language (DTDl). Despite the existence of plentiful use cases, there is a lack of systematic research on what a DT should contain and provide to fully support business continuity, beyond the classical monitoring and failure prediction operations.

*Research Objective 3: Dynamic autonomous adaptation of critical infrastructures to meet resilience goals with personalised assistance in human tasks.*

*Context:* CIs are typically exposing a large surface attack and their integration of Internet of Things, Cloud, and Artificial Intelligence services is opening for novel attack vectors. Manual handling and response to these attacks is an overwhelming task that cannot effectively be handled by SecDevOps teams. Thereby, automation and self-healing mechanisms are key to improve efficiency, accuracy and speed of response. Digital twins are an essential ingredient for such mechanisms as they provide abstractions and models of the running system and offer means to understand and simulate the possible impact of a threat or attack and to explore possible responses.

*State-of-the-art:* Recently, frameworks based on digital twins have been proposed for building smarter, resilient and trustworthy CPS that can self-monitor, self-diagnose and ultimately self-heal. The conceptual framework proposed by Flammini[13] leverages DT run-time models that focus on data-driven evaluation and prediction of critical dependability attributes such as safety. Parriat et al. [29] propose using a DT-based reflective architecture to represent

<sup>1</sup><https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/digital-twins/#features>

and control system structural aspects with reliability requirements, which can be automatically derived from SysML Block Definition Diagrams. Their DT-empowered framework aims to equip remote actuation capabilities, enabling both recoverability and adaptability in a proactive way. There are also domain-specific infrastructure layer self-healing approaches, such as the one dedicated to smart grids by Colson et al. [3], which utilises smart microgrid control agents that cooperate during normal and emergency situations to improve power system resiliency. Online reinforcement learning (RL) [1] enables to create self-adaptive systems able to adapt to a dynamically changing environment to maintain the system's security and quality requirements[1]. Since design time uncertainty hinders the efficiency of the runtime adaptation logic [40], online RL is employed to make the system learn the self-adaptation logic automatically at runtime [35]. After a predefined adaptation reward function is defined, distributed RL agents continuously interact with the environment applying actions and sensing their effects on system status. The goal is to obtain the optimal policy, i.e., the function that maximizes the cumulative reward of an action sequence. Deep RL use Neural Networks (NN) to represent the learned policy. For instance, Deep Q-Network (DQN) algorithm enhances the RL Q-learning algorithm with DNN. However, there are two major drawbacks. First, online RL agents need to be trained before they are used at runtime to avoid them to take arbitrary actions, which is very risky, particularly when controlling Cyber-Physical Systems. Second, Deep RL requires large amounts of training data [23]. Initial attempts to overcome agents training and solution space scalability in security orchestration problem have been proposed [23].

*Research Objective 4: Facilitate the coordinated vulnerability and threat information disclosure across the EU.*

*Context:* Vulnerability and threat information sharing and disclosure is key to strengthen cybersecurity in EU as finders of vulnerabilities and threats should work and share information with the relevant stakeholders. This is particularly relevant in the context of critical infrastructures, which can be interconnected and are typically cyber-physical systems with entities from multiple stakeholders. The Proposal of NIS Directive 2.0 establishes the policies for both coordinated vulnerability disclosure between entities, and a two-stage reporting of incidents to competent authorities. Therefore, CI operators face a double challenge: voluntary information sharing and timely incident reporting.

*State-of-the-art:* Today, collaborative CTI is being built on top of both internal data (e.g., netflow data, vulnerability assessments), and external data sources (e.g., public news and reports, hacker forums, etc.). This enables enhanced identification and understanding of emerging threat vectors and agents. There is a variety of commercial and open-source CTI platforms and tools for sharing and collating CTI indicators and feeds[28], e.g., OpenCTI [12], MISP [25], GOSINT [4], etc. However, in order to fully extract knowledge from multiple heterogeneous sources, it remains a challenge to appropriately collect, rationalise, correlate and evaluate diverse CTI data types. The main challenge remains to decide what type of information should and can be shared across multiple networks to help ML-based threat detection and responses adapt to new coordinated attacks [26]. A critical issue in information sharing is the

separation of user's sensitive data to avoid privacy and security concerns [14]. Furthermore, CTI platforms have the potential to support automatic incident reporting. Therefore, there is an important need for a comprehensive and European platform that offers the possibility of easily sharing, managing privacy and offering end-to-end capabilities from data collection to visualisation and incident response.


### 3 THE DYNABIC APPROACH

The DYNABIC Framework relies on the adoption of defensive AI and novel approaches to continuous business risk management. It is based on enhanced SecDevOps which could drastically improve critical services resilience. DYNABIC proposes the extension of the typical SecDevOps loop to include an Adapt phase as the operations can flexibly accommodate to the evolution of threats and to the changing conditions in which a CI operates. This extension results in the so-called SecDevOpsAdapt loop that is detailed in the following subsection.

#### 3.1 SecDevOpsAdapt cycle

DYNABIC will provide means to facilitate business continuity planning and dynamic control at runtime. The solution builds innovation on top of SecDevOps best practices and results (e.g., from H2020 ENACT project's delivered solution [9–11]) to continuously enhance the preparedness towards business disruption.

DevOps is becoming the mainstream system development practice, which pursues frequent agile updates of system design be deployed directly to the production in order to continuously keep runtime system upgraded. SecDevOps encompasses processes and tools that integrate security considerations and testing across all the DevOps stages, to build security from the ground up, and to reduce system's vulnerabilities. We will combine the continuous enhancement practice with measures for cyber physical resilience, and the result, as shown in Figure 1, will be an extended SecDevOps cycle with an additional Adapt loop running at system operation phase, as proposed by Metzger [24], to ensure autonomous adaptability (self-modify) of the system according to self-observation and context sensing. The final decision making requires human supervision all along to react promptly and correctly to potential disruptions.



**Figure 1: DYNABIC SecDevOpsAdapt cycle for Resilient systems**

### 3.2 The DYNABIC Framework

Figure 2 shows the high-level architecture of the DYNABIC solution to ensure critical infrastructure resilience. The main components are the continuous management of business continuity risks (at the top center of the figure) in the adapt loop. DYNABIC will offer incident detection situational awareness (on the left of the figure) and autonomous adaptability capabilities (on the right of the figure) to support CI operators mastering response to completely new threats. All these services will be combined into the DYNABIC Framework that will enhance business level decision making and enable automatic dynamic execution of disruption recovery and business continuity processes under the best possible conditions at the time.

**3.2.1 Multi-Aspect Digital Twins for Business Continuity Management.** DYNABIC solution pivots on a novel Multi-Aspect Digital Twins for Business Continuity Management (MADT4BC) concept. MADT4BC is the key enabler to achieve research objective 2. The **MADT4BC** is devised as an evolution of traditional digital twins with a triple objective:

- (1) To allow full situational awareness of the CI performance through continuous monitoring and inspection of different views of the system [5], as the MADT4BC represents the real CI system and it is a “live” model synchronized to the running real system;
- (2) To enable simulations of disruptions and threats at development and runtime, as the user can play with the MADT4BC and inject multiple types of threats and incidents, and test and predict their consequences in the system and effects on other dependent systems, as well as assess different options and combinations of response measures strategies to deploy in the system;
- (3) To enable continuous assessment and management of the business disruption and CI performance degradation risks during the whole SecDevOpsAdapt cycle.

DYNABIC MADT4BC enables live models of critical systems capturing: i) infrastructure layer information (network, IT and OT assets, communication protocols, etc.), ii) human actors’ permissions layer, iii) system event and finite state layer, and iv) finally, risk-enriched business process layer, where human actions and system functions are described in form of process activity diagrams showing the flows of data and outcomes. The core of MADT4BC is a knowledge graph representing the key assets of the CI, the live attributes of the assets, and the key relationships among them. The knowledge graph is constituted by multiple models representing the behaviour of the CI from different aspects, such as state machines, access permissions, business processes, etc. The knowledge graph maintains an entry point to access the behaviour models of the relevant assets, as well as the prediction and simulation modules based on these models. In this way, the MADT4BC supports multiple types of reasoning and prognosis of disruptions and performance degradations at the business service level because it is connected to the real system. Predictions on top of MADT4BC benefit not only from historical data but also from resilience parameters collected in real time both from the system and the surrounding context. Furthermore, the MADT4BC will be prepared to inject simulated

inputs and data (e.g., attack vectors) into the real system so as the effects can be analysed as realistically as possible.

Figure 3 illustrates the position of MADT4BC within the DYNABIC approach. As its core element, MADT4BC maintains a live model of the underlying sub-systems, which simulates the main system (the IT and OT infrastructure of use case CI system), the business processes around the main system, and its external environment. The live model is synchronized with the real CI system via a systematic management of software components running on the whole IoT-Edge-Cloud continuum, to collect states and live data from the underlying systems, using a scalable data streaming platform. This solution is specific to the domain and the CI system (i.e., the case), since every system has its unique operational business data, data format, and possible ways of obtaining and maintaining these data.

The MADT4BC solution provides APIs for higher-level analysis of the system to support business continuity management. This includes:

- Real-time monitoring: timely detection and notification of already happened failures, early identification of about-to-happen failures, etc.
- Forward-looking prediction and testing: using the current data/status to run the simulation ahead, to predict potential failures; run the adaptation plans using simulation to test the effectiveness.
- Backward-looking history analysis: learning from the previous failures to plan for system changes, tracing back to event history to understand the root cause of the current vulnerability, etc.

**3.2.2 Business disruption risk management.** First, the **RISKM4BC** component is a dynamic business risk management framework including both design and operation support to cascading impact assessment and real time risk quantification (both likelihood and impact) in the overall chain of Critical Infrastructures. RISKM4BC is the key enabler to achieve research objective 1. This module enables the accurate prospecting of business disruption risks, and it performs the quantitative risks assessment considering also threat impact cascading propagation to other CIs and conditional probability distribution models. To this aim, coordinated incidents and cyber attacks from multiple external sources using a variety of attacking tools and methods will be launched to simulate business degradation and failures and evaluate how disruption risks may propagate. This will be achieved through SIM4BC, an advanced threat simulation tool to test and prepare the whole supply-chain against cascading threats and incidents and ensure minimum self-healing capabilities.

The RISKM4BC will continuously adjust the initial risk estimations through the feedback of multiple parameters (from AWARE4BC below) on the status of the system and deployed protections, which may require to further adjust cascading predictions too. For risk assessment in RISKM4BC, CI performance and business continuity parametrization and KPIs will be required for interconnected systems (including IoT-Cloud-Edge continuum), going beyond traditional resilience KPIs and metrics (e.g., Recovery Point Objective (RPO), Recovery Time Objective (RTO), minimum security service levels, etc.), including maximum allowed degradation of system




Figure 2: DYNABIC Framework components

security and safety, required balance between security and performance.

3.2.3 *Business continuity situational awareness.* The **AWARE4BC** component supports continuous self-observability and monitoring of the critical infrastructure, its environment, and its resilience, as well as advanced detection of hybrid and sophisticated threats and their symptoms. To do so, **AWARE4BC** will ingest and combine heterogeneous data sources from different infrastructure layers (network, system, applications), and different actors in the value chain and in the cyber threat intelligence communities. **AWARE4BC** will be the key enabler to achieve research objective 2.

**AWARE4BC** evaluates the situation by monitoring the internal of the application at multiple layers and applying deep learning and data analytics to perform advanced correlations of system status metrics, context sensors, network traffic traces, together with external CTI sources. The aim is to improve threat intelligence on suffered incidents and attack tactic symptoms, and gain intelligence of indicators of compromise (IOC) from attack information sharing within the value chain community and beyond. This way, **AWARE4BC** will distinguish weak symptoms of zero-day attacks and issues, and it will carry out the root-cause analysis of detected anomalies and incidents.

In complement to the internal monitoring of the system aforementioned, the resiliency of the system (or the efficiency of the resilience mechanisms within the system) will be monitored from a systemic approach with the objective to help decision-makers assessing the relevance of the actions taken to absorb and recover from disruptions. A multi-view approach will be adopted, enabling the evaluation of the performance of the CIs with regards to different perspectives and concerns, from high-level ones (e.g., safety

and environmental properties imposed by institutional standards, certifications and norms) to low-level ones (e.g., functional properties of specific parts of the CIs), as well as supporting different levels of sensor availability and tolerances towards uncertainties. This solution will rely, as much as possible, on a dedicated infrastructure, isolated from the CIs internals. This infrastructural and computational isolation, enabled by the use of Internet of Things (IoT) technologies (e.g., self-powered sensors and edge computers) and communication protocols (e.g., Low Power Wide Area Network, LPWAN), aim at ensuring the independence of the proposed tools and methods from potentially disrupted CIs.

3.2.4 *Security response orchestration.* Upon the novel anomaly is detected, the **SOAR4BC** (Security Orchestration Automation and Response) service, enhanced with RL-based adaptation intelligence, autonomously orchestrates the necessary combination of automatic and human responses that jointly can minimise assessed business continuity risks in real time. AI-based response adaptation and actionable security in **SOAR4BC** enriches the decision and orchestration of which security mechanisms shall be deployed for real-time reactions (immediate) and recovery (longer term) in each of the assets of interconnected critical infrastructures so as to prevent and minimise risk propagation. **SOAR4BC** enables optimisation of required security strategies and tactics, and improved decision support considering assessed risk levels and the different protections deployed at real time in the different interconnected CIs.

**SOAR4BC** orchestrator’s goal is the fast delivery, continuous building, deployment and decommissioning of security mechanisms and system reconfigurations to face escalation and de-escalation of defences and damage retaining walls. The module automatise




Figure 3: DYNABIC Multi-Aspect Digital Twin concept

the synchronisation of multi-layer (multi-organisation, multi-cloud, multi-infrastructure) security workflows according to decided response strategies. SOAR4BC self-healing mechanisms for Energy operators of essential services include for instance islanding of damages through the SDN capabilities, to prevent cascading failures such as a wide-area blackout or a blackout in an area supplying power to another critical infrastructure. While security mechanisms automation will have a major role in short-term reaction, human operators will enter in the long-term recovery loop, who will be assisted through digital avatars providing personalised guidance on actions to do and measures to adopt (AVATAR4BC). SOAR4BC and AVATAR4BC will be the key enablers to achieve research objective 3.

**3.2.5 Information sharing.** Finally, the **CTI4BC** is the DYNABIC Incident Information Sharing component, which will automatically generate the incident and IOCs information tailored to the different stakeholders it will be shared with. CTI4BC will be the key enabler to achieve research objective 4. CTI4BC will communicate with AWARE4BC, SOAR4BC and MADT4BC, and it will dynamically extract and share digital evidences (traces) among different actors, as prescribed by NIS Directive 2.0. The component will integrate with existing open CTI platform such as MISP so as to provide additional intelligence for automation of both CTI sharing and incident notification. For voluntary sharing, CTI4BC will act as a common channel graphicx.or CTI Community Feed of rationalised data on advanced threats, potential defences, etc. to serve third parties to enhance the CTI for more efficient detection. The information endorsed will first undergo anonymisation processes so as to keep secrecy of sharing organisation identity, as well as privacy of any personally identifiable information that may be contained in the digital evidences. For incident reporting, it will offer notifications to relevant stakeholders, including CSIRTs, with the purpose to facilitate incident handling. CTI4BC will enable the incident report including insights of disruption risk level and potential cascading effects to other organisations and CIs, so CSIRTs can early react and inform them.

## 4 CONCLUSIONS

This paper has presented the architecture and the key components of the so-called DYNABIC approach for dynamic business continuity of critical infrastructures on top of adaptive multi-level cybersecurity. DYNABIC aims for the adoption of defensive AI and novel approaches to continuous business risk management based on enhanced SecDevOps that can drastically improve the resilience of critical services in the face of advanced cyber-physical threats. The proposed DYNABIC Framework aims to empower critical infrastructures the ability to predict, quantitatively evaluate, and promptly mitigate business continuity risks along with their potential cascading consequences. Moreover, the framework will facilitate dynamic autonomous adaptation of critical infrastructures, ensuring they align with Resilience goals through automatic optimization and orchestration of response strategies. As the next steps, all the key components of the DYNABIC framework are being developed and interactively undergone validation through two types of demonstrations. The first demonstration will focus on Smart Preparedness, Prevention, and Response to Business Disruption risks in four critical infrastructures and their corresponding supply chains: Electric vehicle charging stations, Critical transport services, Telecommunication infrastructures, and Hospital services. The second demonstration will emphasize Smart Preparedness and Response to Cascading Business Disruption risks within interconnected critical infrastructures.



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